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Liquidity, Contagion and Financial Crisis
ABSTRACT
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital
(e.g., due to reckless trading and/or faulty risk management) leads to
a “freeze” of the interbank market. The fire-sale market plays a central
role in spreading the crisis to the real economy. In crisis, credit rationing
and liquidity hoarding appear simultaneously; endogenous levels of col-
lateral (or margin requirements) are affected by both low fire-sale prices
and high lending rates. Relative to previous analysis, this dual channel
generates a stronger price and output effect. The main focus is on the
policy analysis. We show that i) non-discriminating equity injections
are more effective than liquidity injections, but in both the welfare effect
is an order-of-magnitude lower than the price effect; ii) a discriminating
policy that bails out only distressed banks is feasible but will be limited
by incentive-compatibility constraints; iii) a restriction on international
capital flows has an ambiguous effect on welfare.
Keywords: Debt deflation, bailout, liquidity injection
JEL Classifications: G21, G28, G33
I. Introduction
The “freeze” of the interbank market following the collapse of Lehman Brothers was one
of the defining moments of the recent financial crisis. First, a “dry up” of such dramatic
proportions was unprecedented. Second, at that point the crisis became systemic, spreading
across the entire financial industry and from there to the rest of the economy. Soon after,
“haircuts” widened in the repo market, commercial banks started hoarding liquidity instead
of lending it out while funding in some credit lines (e.g. home mortgages) virtually vanished.
Suddenly, the possibility of a global recession became very real; see Brunnermeier, 2009, and
Adrian and Shin (2009).
A growing body of theoretical literature has already produced some important insights
into this episode, mainly about the mechanism through which financial distress may become
contagious (for a recent survey see Babus, Carletti and Allen, 2009). Most of this literature
exploits the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) conceptual framework, often identifying the triggering
shock as a high level of deposit withdrawals by banks’ clients. In this paper we approach
the problem from a different direction. We argue that the basic shock was a redistribution
of capital across financial intermediaries, probably due to reckless trading and faulty risk
management. Since the trading loss of one intermediary is the gain of another, the redis-
tribution has no direct aggregate effect. At the same time, it tends to create disparity in
capitalization across intermediaries and put the interbank and other liquidity-sensitive mar-
kets under stress. At some point the market may break down and push the entire economy
into recession.1
Figure 1
The evolution of spreads, book and market banking-capitalization Gini coefficients in the
US. We use the Gini coefficient to measure differences in capitalization across
percentiles of bank liabilities. The Gini is increasing in differences in capitalization.
For more detail see Appendix 1.
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To illustrate our approach, we investigate whether a capital redistribution actually took
place in the run-up to the crisis. We calculate the degree of inequality in capitalization across
US banks from 2005.Q1 to 2009.Q4 using the Gini coefficient. Conventionally, the Gini
coefficient is used in order to measure inequality in income across percentiles of population;
1Although in the recent crisis the value of subprime mortgages had to be written down in aggregate, the
amounts involved were modest in comparison to the $8 trillion loss in stock market capitalization between
October 2007 and October 2008 (see Brunnermeier, 2009).
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here we use it in order to measure differences in capitalization across percentiles of bank
liabilities. Figure 1 shows that, Gini coefficients based on both book and market equity have
increased towards the crisis,2 even before the LIBOR-T-bill spread indicated any sign of
weakness in the market. Although this empirical observation falls short of a comprehensive
analysis, it is consistent with the idea that the redistribution “caused” the crisis.
The main objective of our paper is to present a tractable model that captures the salient
features of financial crisis, notably liquidity dry-ups and contagion across intermediaries with
a spill-over to the real sector of the economy. The emphasis here is on tractability so as to (i)
allow us to assess whether a purely redistributive shock can plausibly explain the real effects
of actual crises, and (ii) provide a precise welfare comparison of policy choices. The latter
analysis is executed within the standard conceptual framework of Welfare Economics, but it
has the attractive characteristic that under our assumption the welfare measure is reduced
to expected GNP, where expectations are taken over both the boom and the bust phase of
the business cycle.
Our model has the following structure, elements of which are shared with other papers
(discussed in more detail below). There are speculators, such as hedge funds who can hold
liquidity to buy assets cheaply in times of crisis or inject capital in the lending market.
Although the banking industry has enough funding on aggregate, the redistributive shock
gives rise to inter-bank lending. The terms of lending in that market are endogenously
determined, and under the optimal contract the creditor has a right to repossess a fraction of
assets upon default and sell them off in the fire-sale market. Repossession may be interpreted
as either insolvency or a breach of margin requirements. The fire-sale price of repossessed
assets is affected by the liquidity available in the market, as in Allen and Gale’s (1994)
model of “cash-in-the-market” pricing. The amount of liquidity speculators stock up is
endogenously determined ex ante. We show that in equilibrium, a liquidity shortage and
a financial crisis will appear ex post with a strictly positive probability (as for example in
Gorton and Huang, 2004, or Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2009b).
This mechanism in itself gives rise to the familiar financial amplifier, whereby more fire-
sales depress prices, trigger further “margin calls”, increasing the amount of fire sales even
more (see Allen and Gale, 2005, or Krishnamurthy, 2009 for a discussion). We go beyond the
above by identifying an additional channel through which liquidity shortages spill over into
the real economy, implying stronger amplification than previously thought. In particular,
we show that the interbank lending rate increases during times of crisis because the rate of
return on the alternative use of funds — the purchase of fire-sale assets with hoarded liquidity
2As might be expected from a regulated industry, the series based on market values lies above the one
based on book values.
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— is higher, which increases the collateral requirements even further.
This insight has several important implications. First, because the tight linkage between
the lending and the fire-sales markets, some banks are credit rationed in a crisis, while others
hoard liquidity. Second, the dual channel from liquidity shortage to collateral requirements
(through both liquidation values and lending rates) implies that the magnitude of price
drops in crisis is higher than previous models have suggested. Using plausible parameters,
our model closely matches actual magnitudes (as reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008,
2009)) of price and GNP changes during crisis as well as their observed frequency. For
example, the model’s probability of a financial crisis is 7.7% while fire-sale price and GNP
drop 39.3% and 3.9%, respectively, in crisis. In comparison, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009)
empirical work estimates the probability of a crisis at 7.2%, while asset prices are estimated
to drop 35.5% - 55.9% and GNP drops are around 3.5% - 8.7%. To our knowledge our
analysis is the first to show that redistributive shocks can have such a sizeable effect on
equilibrium outcomes.
Competitive equilibrium is generically inefficient in our economy, which calls for a com-
parative analysis of alternative policies. During the 2008 crisis, two policy measures have
been widely used: liquidity and equity injections. The former was implemented mainly
through the direct purchase of mortgage-backed securities by the US Fed. Although econo-
mists have a rudimentary understanding that supporting the price of assets in the fire-sales
market can alleviate a credit crunch, little is known about the order of magnitude of a liq-
uidity injection needed or how much welfare improvement it generates. We show that by
injecting large amounts of liquidity (2.6% of GNP in our numerical example) a relatively
small welfare improvement can be achieved, around 0.3%. This is because a government
liquidity injection crowds out the private supply of liquidity, which makes the policy neutral
up to the point of full crowding out. Moreover, the welfare improvement is small, because
liquidity is costly to stock up (through public borrowing) but stands idle out of crisis, which
is most of the time.
The US government also provided an equity infusion so as to strengthen banks’ balance
sheets. Since the government cannot observe financial distress, we assume that it infuses
equal amounts to all banks, distressed and non-distressed alike. Surprisingly, in spite of this
“waste” we show that an equity infusion is a more effective policy than a liquidity injection
because equity that is injected to non-distressed banks trickles down to the interbank market,
increasing the supply of liquidity. At the same time, equity that is injected into distressed
banks would improve their balance sheets and moderate fire sales. Hence, an equity infusion
has both a liquidity and a balance-sheet effect, while liquidity injection lacks the latter.
An important question raised by the above discussion is whether the government can
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design a policy that uses less public funds by designing a policy that targets only distressed
banks. Given that the government cannot directly observe distress, such a policy has to
incentivize only distressed banks to apply for a bailout. This imposes an additional constraint
on the designed policy. We show that forcing a bank to liquidate a certain fraction of its
assets and bailing out the rest provides the right incentive. Although such a policy hits
incentive constraints at a somewhat low level of implementation, it can still generate some
value. This policy is thus relevant for countries that have reached high levels of debt and
tax distortion at the margin (not modelled explicitly).
Finally, we investigate the role of international capital mobility in spreading financial cri-
sis globally. We execute the analysis by fragmenting our benchmark economy into separate
countries, requiring that some liquidity is earmarked for domestic use only, while allowing
private speculators to trade across countries. Since contagion results from speculators with-
drawing liquidity from one country (affected by a low-level shock) in order to participate in
the market of another (affected by crisis and low fire-sale prices due to a high-level shock),
restrictions on capital flows may mitigate contagion. But the policy also has a downside:
in some cases the flow of liquidity in the direction above may prevent a crisis in the latter
country without tipping the former into crisis. Hence, when some capital is not mobile liq-
uidity may sit idly in one country while another is affected by crisis. As a result, the effect
of a policy that restricts capital flows is ambiguous, improving welfare in some cases and
decreasing it in others. This means that detailed information on the economy’s structural
parameters is needed in order to fine-tune the policy.
Related literature
There are three major approaches to the analysis of financial crisis. FromMcKay’s (1841)
“extraordinary popular delusions” to Shiller’s (2000) “irrational exuberance” there is a view
that financial crisis results from a black-out of human reason. We shall not consider this view
here, if only because it is hard to square with a proper welfare analysis, which is one of our
main objectives. Then, there is a view, initially formulated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
followed by Morris and Shin (2004) and many others, that crises result from a coordination
failure, usually associated with a (defective) financial structure that has a built-in first-mover
advantage, like demand deposits, or loss limits. Lastly, there is Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation
theory that builds on “two dominant factors, namely over indebtedness to begin with and
deflation following soon after” (emphasis in the original text). Fisher’s own focus on the role
of “distressed selling” hints that the main issue is not the nominal rigidity of debt contracts
per se, but rather the drop (during crisis) in the relative price of capital goods and industrial
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output relative to the value of corporate debt, which drains away companies’ equity.3 , 4
In the autumn of 1998, the US government managed, by sponsoring the rescue of LTCM,
to stop the Asian-Russian financial crisis from spreading to the developed economies, with
hardly any cost to tax-payers. That episode strengthened the view that financial crises
may be a pure coordination failure. Unfortunately, such an optimistic scenario failed to
materialize during the recent crisis. Governments have committed large amounts of resources
with the intention of stabilizing the markets, but the effectiveness of the policy is still debated.
This strongly suggests that coordination failures alone cannot provide a complete explanation
of financial crises. Rather, Fisherian elements such as high levels of indebtedness, fire sales
and depressed prices of capital goods seem to be important in understanding financial crisis.
At the same time, it seems that multiple equilibria should play a role in a theory of financial
crisis, perhaps for cases where the magnitude of the shock is relatively mild. Our model
captures both of these aspects.
There are two main branches of research that are relevant to our paper. Firstly, research
that identifies a propagation mechanism, whereby shocks affect the price of a production
factor, which in turn affects a firm’s access to external finance. Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) construct such propagation models that can be interpreted
as intertemporal contagion. A transitory technological shock propagates for several periods
and dies out eventually.5 A number of papers have extended this type of analysis to allow for
a richer set of frictions within the canonical macro model that is then used for calibration (see
for example Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2009 and references therein). To some extent, the current
paper internalizes these dynamic effects into a single period, where the welfare analysis yields
sharper results.6
Secondly, there is a rich literature that develops the role of liquidity in banking crisis
and contagion via interbank lending (see Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987 or Allen and Gale,
2000, among others). A lot of this research starts from the premise that banking crises are
caused by deposit withdrawals, either because there is a run, maybe following news about
3According to Fisher (see Chart V), from 1929 to 1933 the price level fell by 40%, nominal debt by 20%
while nominal national wealth fell by 59%; so the price of capital goods must have fallen significantly more
than 40%.
4In addition there is a literature that focuses on the role of asymmetric information in financial crisis (see
Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman, 2008, 2009, and Heiderer, Hoerova, Holthausen, 2009). Since these papers
are less concerned with the real effects of crisis we will not discuss them here in detail.
5Suarez and Sussman (1997, 2007) use a similar setting in order to generate endogenous, rational expec-
tations, financially driven cycles that may never die out. Fire sales of assets play a pivotal role in generating
the necessary price effects: start-ups buy capital goods on the second-hand market from financially distressed
companies of the previous generation.
6There is a further trade-off in working with the canonical, infinite-horizon, representative-agent model.
In order to retain tractability the latter type of model has to impose strong assumptions in one way or
another.
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poor future fundamentals (Allen and Gale, 1998) or there is an unexpectedly large amount
of withdrawals, with welfare effects due to imperfect risk sharing.7 Our approach differs
along two dimensions. First, the triggering shock in our model is a redistribution of equity
capital across banks. We believe this type of shock was more relevant in the recent crisis
than a shock to consumer preferences. Second, in our model welfare effects are driven by
the deadweight loss of liquidating assets and not by imperfect risk sharing. We believe that
the main policy concern in the current crisis are real effects of financial frictions, and not
primarily risk sharing. Our modelling approach is thus closer to Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), where liquidity plays a role
for corporate investment and a lack of liquidity leads to a direct loss in output. Gorton
and Huang (2004) summarize the two key ingredients that are necessary for the modeling of
liquidity: “first, there must be a need to trade... [and] second, there is a restriction needed,
namely, not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets. Buyers must be restricted
to making purchases only with certain assets, “liquid” assets. This restriction is akin to a
“cash-in-advance constraint”.
Several authors have already done some work on integrating these two lines of research.
One basic finding is that when productive assets change hands at an interim date through a
spot market (rather than delivered at an ex-ante contracted price that captures some insur-
ance opportunities), an ex-ante externality arises that leads to inefficient levels of borrowing
or investment in liquidity. This type of externality has been explored in numerous papers,
among others by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003, 2004) in the context of inter-
national finance, in a banking context by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Freixas, Martin
and Skeie (2009), and Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2009a), and in a corporate finance
context by Gorton and Huang (2004), Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2009) and Acharya, Shin
and Yorulmazer (2009b).8
Our paper differs from the above in several respects. Firstly, in the above papers that
focus on non-banking applications, the shock that triggers the propagation mechanism is to
cash flows generated by investment. In this sense it is akin to a technology shock in the Real-
Business-Cycle literature. It is widely accepted, however, that price movements during crisis
are far too dramatic to be explained by any technological news. Hence, we took the modeling
decision to ignore any technological uncertainty. Secondly, unlike most of the papers on
financial amplification, we fully endogenize the “margin requirements” that are at the heart
7See, however, Goodhart, Tsomocos and Sudirand (2004, 2006) who analyze financial fragility in a general
equilibrium setting. There, a liquidity need is modelled through a cash-in-advance constraint, rather than
shocks to consumption preferences.
8See also Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008a, b) for a more general analysis of efficiency properties of equi-
librium in a related setting.
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of the feedback between fire-sales prices and the volume of distressed selling. In an interesting
paper Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that margin requirements based on value-
at-risk worsen precisely during times of crisis. We present a similar finding, although for
very different reasons. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) margin requirements respond
to increases in volatility. In our setting they increase because the real lending rate increases
during times of crisis.9 Finally, endogenizing contracts in a tractable way allows us to conduct
a precise welfare analysis of some of the key policies actually employed during the recent
crisis. This allows us to rank policies in terms of welfare improvements per dollar of taxpayer
money spent, and provide a basic quantitative assessment of their likely welfare impact.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets out the model. The
financial contract is solved for in Section III and Section IV characterizes the economy’s
equilibrium. We explore welfare and policy implications in Section V. Section VI contains
an extension in which analyze the implications of market fragmentation and liberalization.
Section VII concludes.
II. The Model
We start with a technical description of the model and postpone the discussion of the eco-
nomic significance of the assumptions to a subsection below. Consider a small, open economy
with four periods t = 0, ..., 3. There are two types of agents: banks, of which there is a con-
tinuum of measure one, and speculators. All agents are risk neutral and maximize total
consumption (there is no discounting).
Speculators can decide at the initial date t = 0 to invest their funds across two assets.
There is an illiquid asset that yields a riskless gross return ρ0 ≥ 1 at t = 3. Exiting from the
illiquid technology prior to t = 3 yields a zero payoff.10 Moreover, we assume that the payoff
from that investment is non-verifiable and thus non-pledgeable, so that speculators cannot
borrow against the illiquid positions. In addition there is a storage technology that yields a
gross return of one every period. The storage technology corresponds to a liquid asset. We
denote by F the aggregate amount of funds invested in the liquid asset and assume that
speculators have sufficient funds such that there is no technological upper bound on F . The
supply of liquidity at t = 0 is therefore perfectly elastic. Because of our assumptions on the
illiquid technology, the t = 1 supply of liquidity is F completely inelastic.
Each bank is owned and managed by a single owner-manager. At t = 1 each bank gains
9In a recent paper Diamond and Rajan (2009) also point out that the lending rate to the real sector may
increase during times of crisis, because of the high returns that can be earned in the fire-sales market. In
their paper, however, there is no feedback effect from this rate increase to the “margin requirements” in the
interbank market.
10This assumption is standard in the banking literature; see Allen and Gale (1994) among others.
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access to one long-term investment project and receives an endowment of consumption goods,
their capital, which they use in order to fund the project. To operate, the project requires
one unit of investment good. At this stage banks may convert one unit of consumption good
to one unit of investment good at no extra cost. A random fraction, θ, of banks have an
endowment of w < 1 (fixed deterministically), and need external funding in order to operate
their projects. All other banks have a capital slack with an endowment of wn (a random
variable) that is always sufficient to fund them internally. The aggregate endowment W of
the economy is fixed (deterministically), namely
W ≡ θw + (1− θ)wn = 1. (1)
Notice that equation (1) determines wn as a function of θ so that wn ≥ 1 for any realization
of θ. Let h (θ) be the density function of θ with a cumulative distribution function H (θ).
Assume that H (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing on its entire support
£
0, θ
¤
. We
assume that endowments are non-verifiable. As a result, no insurance scheme against capital
shortage can operate.11
The banks’ lending activity is economically viable: if carried to maturity each bank’s
project generates the same earning flows, 2y , of consumption goods. That amount is evenly
distributed over the life-cycle of the loans: y units of consumption goods at t = 2 and y units
at t = 3. Some banks’ projects may, however, experience a liquidity shock such that they
generate zero at t = 2 and 2y at t = 3. We assume y > ρ0. As will become evident later,
this is a necessary condition for speculators to want to invest in the liquid asset. Liquidity
shortages are idiosyncratic to each bank and occur with a probability of 1− π. By the law
of large numbers 1− π is thus also the fraction of banks subject to a liquidity shock. Notice
the distinction between t = 1 capital shortage and t = 2 liquidity shortage.
The market for external funding operates at t = 1 after θ has been realized and publicly
observed. We assume that earning flows from the projects are non-verifiable and cannot be
pledged to a third party. As a result, the only incentive-compatible form of external funding
for banks is a standard debt contract as in Hart and Moore (1998); see contract section
below. We denote the fraction of the investment that a bank has to pledge as collateral by
β, which the lender has the right to repossess at t = 2 if the contracted repayment, R, is in
default. This set-up is a convenient way of capturing the important real-world feature that
banks fund their long-term lending activity (the project) through short-term debt. The risk-
free gross lending rate (on loans payable at t = 2) is endogenously determined and denoted
11This is in line with the assumption made in models of adverse selection in the interbank market, where
banks cannot insure up front against changes in the value of their assets (see for example Heiderer, Hoerova
and Holthausen, 2009 or Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman, 2008). For a detailed analysis of the role of
insurance against liquidity shocks see Holmstrom and Tirole (2008).
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by ρ1. By our assumption thatW = 1 the banking sector is self sufficient so that the lending
market can be thought of as an interbank market.
We make two further assumptions about the way in which lending and collateral reposses-
sions work. First, debt contracts cannot be settled by transferring some or all of the bank’s
project to the creditor. Rather, collateral needs to be auctioned off, using the proceeds to
satisfy lenders. This generates a role for a fire-sale market. Thus, a market for repossessed
capital goods opens at t = 2. We denote the equilibrium spot price by q. Additionally,
bidders need to submit orders and the necessary liquidity to execute them before the t = 2
production process is completed. As a result, t = 2 manufactured consumption goods are
excluded from fire-sale auction and only liquidity that was stocked up t = 1 can participate.
Second, repossessions destroy value. We assume that once some or all of a loan portfolio is
detached from its originating bank, it only yields δ ≤ 1 units of non-verifiable consumption
goods at t = 3. This captures the idea that banks have some local monitoring expertise.
When another bank (or speculator) takes over the project, his monitoring will be less effec-
tive, reducing project value (or, alternatively, he will have to incur a higher monitoring cost
to preserve full project value).
Notice that the t = 2 capital-goods price, q, can be perfectly anticipated at t = 1 when θ
is realized and observed. Banks with spare funds can therefore earn a gross rate of return of
δ
q from hoarding funds for the future purchase of fire-sales assets. By arbitrage, the return
ρ1 from lending on the interbank market must thus equal the return from participating in
the fire-sale market, i.e.,
ρ1 =
δ
q
. (2)
A. Discussion of the assumptions
The motivation for assuming redistributive shocks is already explained in the introduction.
We attempt to capture a pure financial shock caused by “reckless trading and faulty risk
management”, which by itself has no effect on real productive capacity. In the absence
of financial frictions, the shock has no effect on aggregate output. The challenge facing
theory is to explain how, in a world with financial frictions (here in the form of the non-
pledgeability of cash flows), financial shocks destroy real value in equilibrium. Notice that
equation (1) implies not only that aggregate wealth, W , is deterministic but also that it
equals the economy’s total investment opportunities, namely 1. That has the convenient
implication that for any realization of θ, wn exceeds 1 so that banks are cleanly separated
to capital short and capital slack — potential lenders and borrowers in the interbank market.
In the same spirit, we abstract from productivity shocks on a project level: potentially, all
10
projects are economically viable unless disrupted by a shortage of liquidity that leads to
repossession. By that assumption we capture the dominant policy concern during financial
crisis: that economically viable projects are “inefficiently” liquidated due to a temporary
shortage of liquidity.
The assumption that banks operate projects directly is obviously an abstraction, albeit
one that has become common in the literature following Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We
prefer to think about these projects as real activities rather than financial securities so as to
allow us to explore the link between financial markets and the real economy; see the discussion
of the model’s quantitative implications in Section A below. The effect on aggregate real
output is due to the deadweight loss of repossessions. In this respect our approach differs
from most papers in the banking literature which focus on the insurance role of banks and
do not model repossessions. Our approach is thus closer to the one taken in the corporate
finance literature (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
As for the interpretation of β, we are aware that lending in some interbank markets,
e.g. LIBOR, is unsecured. Others, like the repo market are secured. Hence, the proper
interpretation of β is the share of borrowing that is directed towards the secured segment of
the market. From a modelling point of view one could think of a creditor as providing two
loans, one unsecured and one secured. If the borrowing bank does not honor its payments
on the unsecured loan, the creditor would cease his collateral on the secured loan and stop
lending. β can then be thought of as the fraction of secured lending needed to support
unsecured lending on the remaining fraction 1− β of debt. Notice also that the terminology
differs across markets and that “collateral” may be relabeled as “margin requirement”.
The restriction on settlement in kind of debt contracts is standard in the banking lit-
erature.12 It is plausible since, lenders are in practice often unable to repossess collateral
directly. Instead, the trustee in a bankruptcy procedure may have to auction off the assets
and distribute the proceeds among the creditors according to their seniority. We do not
model this argument explicitly. Clearly, the price determined in this auction is affected by
the availability of liquidity, which is where the assumption that bids need to be submitted
prior to the completion of the t = 2 production process, binds. This assumption is made
mainly for its quantitative plausibility and will be discussed in Section A below.
12The assumption is also standard in the macroeconomics literature based on cash-in-advance constraints,
which derives from the observation that “money buys goods ... but goods don’t buy goods” (in our setting,
liquidity is defined in terms of a numeraire consumption good rather than fiat money).
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III. The contract
Consider the case of a bank in need of external finance (w < 1). Due to non-verifiability, a
cash-contingent contract is not implementable. Instead, Hart and Moore (1998) show that
the optimal contract allows the providers of external funding to collect payment under threat
of repossession. Namely, the borrower commits to a certain repayment, R, and the lenders
are given default-contingent repossession rights on a fraction β of the project. (Since, by
the very nature of the interbank market, both sides to the deal are banks, we conduct the
analysis in terms of lenders and borrowers.) In short, the optimal contract is a standard,
secured, debt contract.
To see why, consider, first, a liquid borrower (earning y in both t = 2, 3). Clearly,
payments cannot be deferred to t = 3, for then the assets have already depleted and the
threat of repossession is empty. Even at t = 2, repayments are subject to the constraint
that the borrower cannot renegotiate a lower payment. Renegotiations are modelled as
a Nash bargaining game: with a probability λ the lender can make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer; if it is rejected he can exercise his rights and repossess the investment. Hence, the
lender’s equilibrium offer equals the opportunity cost of the assets to the borrower, βy.
With probability 1−λ the borrower makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which (by a symmetric
argument) would be as low as the liquidation value qβ. It follows that the repayment, R ,
has to satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
R ≤ β [(1− λ) q + λy] . (IC)
Subject to the IC, liquid borrowers repay their debt, leaving repossession and contract rene-
gotiation off the equilibrium path.
Consider now a financially-distressed borrower (earning zero at t = 2 and 2y at t = 3).
Clearly such a bank cannot defer payment to t = 3, and has no liquidity to settle at t = 2.
At the same time the lender has no incentive to forgive payment, so he will exercise his rights
and repossess the collateral. It follows that the lender’s participation constraint (PC) is
πR+ (1− π) βq = ρ1 (1− w) , (PC)
where ρ1 =
δ
q (see equation (2)). We assume that the PC holds with equality due to the
competition among lenders. The contract also needs to satisfy the feasibility constraints
R ≤ y, and β ∈ [0, 1] . (FC)
Now, the contract problem is to maximize the borrower’s value (at t = 3) subject to the
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various constraints above:
max
R,β
π (2y −R) + (1− π) (1− β) 2y, (3)
s.t. (IC), (PC), (FC) .
(We deal with the participation constraint of the borrower below.) Substituting (PC) into
the objective function and re-arranging, we express the final value of a capital short bank in
terms of β alone:
V |w = 2y − ρ1 (1− w)− (1− π)β(2y − q). (4)
The bank’s value is the project payoff 2y, minus the cost of external funding, minus the
dead-weight loss of external funding, which is the probability of distress, (1− π), times the
collateralized fraction of the investment, β, times the deadweight loss per unit of capital
repossessed (2y − q). Clearly, the smaller β, the higher is the borrower’s value.
Lemma 1 Let
b =
ρ1 (1− w)
q (1− λπ) + λπy . (5)
If b ≤ 1, the optimal contract is β = b; if b > 1, a capital short bank cannot obtain external
funding.
Now substitute the arbitrage condition (2) into equation (5) to obtain b as a function of
q alone: b (q). (Remember that q is perfectly anticipated at t = 1.) Clearly, banks need to
pledge a greater fraction of their project as collateral when the fire-sale price, q, drops. On the
PC side, when distressed assets sell at a lower price, more needs to be sold so that the lender
can break even. At the same time, the opportunity cost of funding, ρ1, increases because
lenders can earn a higher rate of return by holding their funds to participate in next period’s
fire-sale market. On the IC side, with a lower fire-sale price, the threat of repossession is less
effective, which supports a lower repayment. Both ways, collateral requirements increase.
Since all pledged assets of distressed banks are repossessed and then sold off, it follows
that the volume of liquidations, θ (1− π)β, increases when fire-sale prices drop. Moreover,
substituting (2) into (5), it is clear that the value of repossessed assets, q × θ (1− π)β,
also increases when the fire-sale price drops. Hence, the demand for liquidity is downwards
sloping in q, which plays an important role in the equilibrium analysis below.
Let q be the positive root of b (q) = 1:
q =
−λπy +
q
(λπy)2 + 4 (1− λπ) δ (1− w)
2 (1− λπ) . (6)
13
If prices ever drop that low, a credit-rationing equilibrium occurs (generically). Clearly,
prices cannot get lower than that. For then, lenders cannot recover a market return even at
the highest feasible β. The only way to avoid this outcome is to deny credit to some banks.
Let μ be the probability of obtaining credit. Clearly, if q > q, μ = 1; if q = q, μ ∈ [0, 1],
to be determined endogenously in equilibrium. Notice that our assumptions do not prevent
credit-rationed banks from lending their capital to others on the interbank market.
Consider next the case of a capital slack bank withwn > 1, so that the project is internally
funded (β = 0); its final value is 2y + (wn − 1) ρ1. Using the arbitrage condition in (2) we
can express the expected maturity values for any endowment w ∈ {w,wn} as:
V = w
δ
q
+ μS, (7)
S =
µ
2y − δ
q
¶
− (1− π)
δ
q [1−min (1, w)]
q (1− λπ) + λπy (2y − q). (8)
It is convenient to think of the final value as the sum of endowment wealth (including
interest), wρ1, plus the rent, S, generated by the bank’s access to a project, provided that
it can get funding. The rent equals the value of the technology, net of the opportunity cost
of capital, less the deadweight loss of external funding (if used). Crucially, in a model with
financial frictions the value of the rent is not just a function of technology but also of the
bank’s initial wealth and of the fire-sale price, q.
Now that we have expressed the lowest conceivable equilibrium price, q, in terms of the
model’s structural parameters, we can use it in order to lay down two additional parametric
assumptions that guarantee the existence of equilibrium. Firstly, speculators will not par-
ticipate in the fire-sale market if prices are above δ, for then the return on holding liquidity
at date zero is higher than the highest possible return on liquidity. At the same time, the
contract requires that the fire-sale price is (weakly) above q. We therefore assume that
δ
q
> ρ0. (A1)
Since ρ0 > 1 assumption (A1) guarantees that q < δ so that the set of feasible equilibrium
prices,
£
q, δ
¤
, is non-empty.
Secondly, we still have to check that it is in the best interest of banks to operate their
projects rather than invest their capital at the market rate. Given expressions (7) and (8)
it is clear that participation requires that the rent for project access, S, is positive for both
w and wn for any price in
£
q, δ
¤
.
Lemma 2 π2y − δq ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for S > 0, at any feasible equilibrium price.
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We thus assume that
π2y − δ
q
≥ 0. (A2)
Notice the intuitive interpretation of assumption (A2): in a perfect market a positive NPV
is sufficient in order to guarantee project acceptance (remember that ρ1 =
δ
q ). In our setting,
a stronger condition is required in order to account for the potential loss of value due to
financial distress.
A. Model parameterization
We carry along the paper a numerical example that helps to illustrate the functioning of the
model and allows us to make a few points that are hard to make analytically. Some of the
parameters in Table 1 seem plausible on their own and some are hard to pin down due to the
stylized nature of the model. As we shall see, the model matches a few important statistic
of financial crisis, yet we would not claim this is to be, in any way, a test of the model.
As noted above, we think of “projects” as real production facilities. As a result, we
think of the time horizon of our model, from t = 0 to t = 3 as a five-year period. Needless
to say, the time index , t, indicates decision and trading events rather than equally-spaced
points within a five-year interval; for example, the production period t = 1 to t = 2 is
probably much lengthier than, say, the time between t = 0 and t = 1. We then assume that
y = 1.25 which implies an internal rate of return (IRR) of around 20% per annum. This
is way above, say, 8% that would be consistent with macroeconomic data. One reason for
using such a high number is the view that young, productive and innovative ventures are
harder hit during financial crisis. Another motivation is to include in y “private benefits”
of stakeholders that are not explicitly modelled, predominantly labor. We assume that the
probability that a project will suffer from cash shortage is 5% per annum or 25% over the
5 year period, which yields the parameterization for π. This is consistent with US banking
statistics of around 1% write-off rate 13 assuming recovery rate of about 80% on average (so
that 1% = (1− 0.8) ∗ 5%).14
Perhaps the most difficult parameter to quantify is external funding, 1 − w. Under our
assumption capital-short banks raise all that amount externally. Since debt is the only
source of external finance, 1 − w is the leverage of capital-short banks. Clearly, 40% is
very low for banks. However, if “projects” are to be interpreted as production facilities,
our model’s “banks” should be interpreted as a consolidation of banks and their clients.
That makes some economic sense: the financial stability of banks depends, at least to some
13See “loan and lease charge off” against the balance-sheet value of loan and lease in FDIC statistics since
the early 1980’s.
14See Franks and Sussman (2005).
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extent, on the capitalization of their clients. From that point of view a 40% leverage seems
more reasonable.15 We also assume that up to 40% of banks may be short of capital. Our
parameterization of δ and ρ0 is standard; for λ and the distribution function h (θ) we have
no supporting data.
In light of these assumptions, it is worth pointing out another motivation for the previous
section’s assumption that consumption goods produced at t = 2 are not allowed to participate
in the fire sale market. According to our parameterization, no more than 10% (namely
θ (1− π)) of capital stock is actually repossessed at t = 2. At the same time, 37.5% (namely
(1− π) /2) of the five-year potential output has already been produced, and is available in
the form of consumption goods. Obviously, it would be unrealistic to assume that all that
amount is available to bid for fire-sale assets. Rather, we assume that part of that production
is consumed and part may find its way to the liquidity market but only with a lag. As a
result, liquidity needs to be earmarked for that purpose one period ahead of market opening.
Table 1
Structural parameters for the numerical examples below.
Description Model’s notation Parameterization
Project parameters
IRR 2y − 1 150%
prob. liquidity shortage 1− π 25%
capital shortage 1− w 40%
depreciation δ 50%
bargaining power λ 50%
Market parameters
ex-ante riskless rate ρ0 − 1 5%
worse-case incidence of shortfall θ 40%
distribution of θ h uniform
B. Discussion and numerical example
Using the parameters above, we plot in Figure 2 rent, S, that bank’s owner derives from
being able to access projects, as a function of the fire-sale price q for both types of banks in
the model. As mentioned, the graph of a capital-short bank lies below the graph of a capital-
slack bank. Clearly, the model’s parameterization does not violate assumptions (A1)-(A2).
The vertical segment corresponds to different values of μ. At μ = 0 a capital-short bank gets
15Rajan and Zingales (1995) report mean book (market) leverage (debt to net assets) for listed companies
of 38% (27%) in the United States and 25% (19%) in Germany.
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and has rent of zero.
A basic intuition for the workings of the model can already be acquired at this point.
Consider a redistribution of $1 from a capital-short bank to a capital-slack bank, holding
the liquidation price at its highest possible level: q = δ = 0.5. As a result, aggregate rent
would fall by c/64. This is because the extra wealth does not generate any rent (above market
return) in the hands of the capital-slack bank; however, once a bank becomes capital short,
it needs to fund externally and pledge a fraction β of its investment as collateral. That
fraction will be repossessed in case of liquidity shortage, destroying value.
At a lower q, rents are lower for both types because the opportunity cost of capital, ρ1,
is higher (see Figure 1). Yet the gap between the two increases as well. As a result, a
redistribution of $1 from a capital-short bank to a capital-slacked bank at a fire-sale price of
q = q would result in a loss of output of $1.37.
Figure 2
Rent obtained from access to project, S, for capital-slacked
capital short banks. For structural parameters, see Table 1.
internally-funded
companies
µ=1
µ=0
S
externally funded
companies
δ
q
credit rationing
IV. Competitive equilibrium
We take two steps in characterizing the competitive equilibrium. First, we analyze the ex-
post market for liquidity, where F is predetermined and θ is already realized. Second, we
analyze the ex-ante determination of F at t = 0. We then discuss the economic significance
of the results and analyze the quantitative equilibrium implications of the numerical example
above.
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A. The ex-post market for liquidity
The ex-post equilibrium condition combines two spot markets. First, at t = 1, capital-short
banks are funded. Then, at t = 2 , fire sales are absorbed by market liquidity. Since the
prices in these markets are linked via the arbitrage condition (2), equilibrium is determined
by a single market-clearing condition:
F + (wn − 1) (1− θ) + θ (1− μ)w − θμ (1− w)− θμq (1− π) b (q) ≥ 0. (9)
On the supply side we have speculators, capital-slack banks supplying (wn − 1), and a frac-
tion, (1− μ), of the capital-short banks who happen to be credit-rationed and are thus
willing to lend their capital endowment at the market rate. On the demand side, there are
the capital-short banks who are not credit rationed. The last term in equation (9) comes
from the fire-sale market. There are θ capital-short banks, of which a fraction μ actually
gets funded. Of these, a fraction (1− π) will be short of liquidity and thus default, in which
case lenders would repossess a fraction b (q) of the investment. The amount of liquidity that
is required in order to absorb it is a product of the above times the fire-sale price, q. Since
there might be more liquidity available than demand, the clearing condition might hold with
inequality, where the supply of liquidity is greater then the demand.
Using (1) we can rewrite the clearing condition (9) as
F +W ≥ (1− θ) + θμ [1 + q (1− π) b (q)] , (10)
where the left- and right-hand side of the inequality can be thought of as liquidity supply
and demand, respectively.
Proposition 1 There exists an ex-post equilibrium in the market for liquidity, with three
possible regimes:
• If θ < F+W−1q(1−π) then there is a unique equilibrium with a slack of liquidity: q = δ, μ = 1.
• If F+W−1q(1−π) ≤ θ ≤ F+W−1δ(1−π)b(δ) there is a multiplicity of equilibria as follows: (i) q = δ and
μ = 1, (ii) q ∈
¡
q, δ
¢
and μ = 1, (iii) q = q, μ < 1.
• If θ > F+W−1δ(1−π)b(δ) there is a unique credit-rationing equilibrium: q = q, μ < 1.
In a credit rationing equilibrium (either the second or the third regime) the amount of
credit rationing is:
μ =
F +W − (1− θ)
θ
£
1 + q (1− π)
¤ . (11)
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Figure 3 provides a diagrammatic exposition of the equilibrium and the existence argu-
ment in Proposition (1). The supply of liquidity is the inverted L-shaped graph, δ hori-
zontally and F +W vertically. As noted the demand for liquidity (the right-hand side of
(10)) is decreasing in the fire-sale price, q. Hence, both supply and demand for liquidity
are (weakly) decreasing in q. Three possible realizations of θ are plotted: for the low and
high realizations there is a unique equilibrium at points B and C, respectively, while for
the interim realization there are multiple equilibria at points A, A0 and A00, one with q = δ
and a slack of liquidity, one q ∈
£
δ, q
¤
and market clearing, and one with q = q and credit
rationing, respectively.16
Figure 3
The ex-post market for liquidity
q
liquidity
F+W
q
demand
supply
AB
A’
A’’ C
δ
Since asset repossession destroys value, the three equilibria in Figure 3 are Pareto ranked:
point A dominating points A0 and A00. Hence, the government should try to coordinate
expectations towards point A. We thus show:
Proposition 2 In case of multiple equilibria, a policy that guarantees a fire-sale price of δ
eliminates the Pareto-dominated equilibrium points at a zero fiscal cost to the government.
Clearly, when supply and demand are both (weakly) decreasing, multiple equilibria may
arise. Unlike in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), our model does not rely on any “defective”
financial instrument — demand deposits with their built-in first-mover advantage. However,
16Since C and A00 denote rationing equilibria, one cannot read equilibrium quantities straight from the
figure.
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like in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the government can coordinate expectations towards
one of the equilibrium points and improve welfare at zero fiscal cost (in equilibrium). The
underlying policy instruments are also similar: deposit insurance in Diamond and Dybvig
and credit guarantees in our model.17 Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences: in
our model the elimination of dominated equilibria will not restore the first best; even without
multiplicity markets do fail and value is destroyed (see next section). Another important
implication is that in our setting multiple equilibria appear at intermediate levels of the
liquidity shock, θ, but vanish as the shock intensifies. Hence, the issue is not so much which
theory is correct; rather, at what intensity of the shock policy might have to move from a
phase where value can be created just by coordinating expectations to one where value can
be created only by active market support.
From this point onwards we shall assume that the government always implements a zero-
cost policy that eliminates Pareto dominated equilibria via coordination of expectations. As
a result, there is a unique critical point,
θ∗ =
F +W − 1
δ (1− π) b (δ) (12)
such that a credit-rationing equilibrium appears when θ > θ∗.
Lastly, and in order to improve the macro interpretation of the model we calculate the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Y , as it should be measured in our model:
Y ≡ (1− θ) 2y + θμ [2y − (1− π) b (q) (2y − δ)] + θ (1− μ) .
It is “gross” in the sense that depreciation is netted out, and “domestic” in the sense that
interest payments to foreigners (speculators) are excluded.
B. The ex-ante equilibrium: speculators’ choice
Speculators allocate their funds at t = 0 so as to maximize their expected t = 3 payoff. We
then show the following.
Proposition 3 Given assumption (A1) and the implementation of policies to coordinate
expectations as suggested by Proposition 2, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium.
The amount of liquidity held by the market, F , satisfies
H (θ∗) + [1−H (θ∗)] δ
q
= ρ0, (13)
17Bebchuk and Goldstein (2009) discuss the role of government guarantees when banks’ lending deci-
sions may be subject to coordination failure. In their paper complementarities arise from the production
technology, while in ours they arise from price effects.
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and there is a strictly positive probability of a financial crisis.
C. Discussion and numerical example
Many metaphors have been used in order to describe financial crisis: price spirals, liquidity
black holes (see Morris and Shin, 2004), a break-down or freeze of the interbank market,
a crash, contagion etc. Our analysis suggests that they can all be reduced to one simple
property of the market for liquidity: that both supply and demand are downwards sloping.
As a result, prices may be highly sensitive to changes in the demand for liquidity, particularly
in the neighborhood of the critical point θ∗. As prices fall, lenders to capital-short banks
demand more collateral, which will be repossessed and sold off in case the bank is also short
of liquidity, which will increase the demand for liquidity even further. In that respect, the
crisis is contagious and feeds itself: a slight increase in the number of capital-short banks
can generate a credit crunch that affects all other capital-short banks.
Liquidity hoarding deserves special emphasis. In crisis, the clearing condition (9) holds
with equality, which means that all the liquidity that was stocked up at t = 0 is used, either
to fund capital-short banks or to absorb fire sales. Although the funding and the fire-sale
markets are aggregated into a single market-clearing condition, the two markets actually
operate sequentially. As a result, banks hoard liquidity at t = 1 in order to participate in
the fire-sale market at t = 2. Moreover, in times of crisis liquidity hoarding coexists with
credit rationing in the interbank lending market: Some capital-short banks are denied credit
at the market rate (which is exceptionally high) while capital-slack banks “sit” on resources
that are not utilized in the short run.18 Hence the impression of a “freeze”: liquidity is
apparently available, but the market no longer succeeds in transferring it from providers to
users.
In spite of these seemingly anomalous results, our modeling remains solidly neoclassical.
The equilibrium concept is Walrasian, with only few additional restrictions. Importantly,
the “margin requirements” that many models impose so as to trigger asset sales upon the
decline in market value are fully endogenized. Besides elegance this addition opens the way
to the welfare analysis below: models with exogenous margin requirements cannot address
normative questions of welfare and government policy since they exclude from the analysis
the frictions that necessitate the margin requirements in the first place. Hence, they ignore
by construction how government policy affects the resolution of the underlying frictions. Less
common in the literature is the introduction of rationing equilibria. Beyond adding realism
this aspect completes the modelling in an important manner: when both supply and demand
18Other papers that feature liquidity hoarding include Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Acharya, Shin and
Yorulmazer (2009a). Simultaneous credit rationing, however, does not incur in those models.
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are downwards sloping the curves may not intersect, so a price floor needs to be introduced.
In our modelling, this floor is also endogenously determined through the same contractual
mechanism that endogenizes the margin requirements.
In Table 2 we present equilibrium magnitudes computed for the parameterization from
Table 1. Where possible we list the actual data based on the most comprehensive survey of
financial crisis to date: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009). Stylized as it is, the model is rich
enough to generate most of the statistics that one uses to describe financial crisis: at the
contagion point, θ∗, the price of repossessed capital goods drops by almost 40% and GDP
falls by 3.9%.19 The number might seem small given the massive loss of value at the project
level upon liquidation. Notice however that although up to 40% of banks can be short of
capital, only 25% of them become financially distressed (remember that internally-financed
banks avoid financial distress even if short of liquidity). The crisis is accompanied by a severe
“credit crunch”: in normal times capital-short banks can borrow c/78 on a dollar of collateral
but during a crisis they can borrow only c/40 on a dollar of collateral. Credit rationing will
appear during financial crisis, but the magnitude is not substantial, between 1.1% and 1.6%,
depending on θ, which implies a relatively steep demand for liquidity (see Figure 3). Perhaps
most importantly, the crisis probability, 7.7%, is remarkably close to the actual magnitude.
Table 2
Competitive equilibrium, numerical example. For structural parameters see Table 1.
Source for actual data is Reinhart and Rogoff (RR), from top to bottom: (a) peak-to-trough
house and equity price decline, RR (2009) Figures 1 and 2; (b) calculations based on
depth and duration of GDP decline, annualized (left) or stretched over a five-year period
relative to a growth trend of 2% per annum (right), RR (2009) Figure 4; (c) share of years in banking
crisis, RR (2008) Table 5a.
Description Model Values Actual data
Competitive equilibrium
price drop in crisis
q
δ − 1 −39.3% −35.5%, −55.9%(a)
loan to security (1−w)b(δ) ,
(1−w)
b(q)
78%, 40% —
output drop at θ∗ Y |q=qÁ Y |q=δ − 1 −3.9% −3.5%, −8.8%(b)
credit rationing at θ∗ [1− μ (θ∗)] 1.1% —
probability of a crisis 1−H (θ∗) 7.7% 7.2%(c)
In order to get some idea of the robustness of the numerical results with respect to
underlying parameters, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. The upshot of it is that the
19The relatively-wide range in the actual numbers reflects that several mappings from Reinhart and Ro-
goff’s evidence into the frequency of our data are admissible.
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orders of magnitude of our results are not affected by small modifications of the parametric
assumptions. Details of this analysis are provided in Appendix 3.
V. Policy and welfare analysis
During the recent crisis policies towards the restoration “financial stability” have been im-
plemented on an unprecedented scale. Governments and central banks all over the world
were given permission to inject liquidity into the open market by purchasing “troubled as-
sets” that are “off limits” during normal times. The rationale for this policy is that public
liquidity supports prices in secondary markets and helps distressed banks from further de-
terioration. In other cases, governments have “infused equity” directly into the balance
sheet of troubled institutions through ownership stakes and, in some extreme cases, de facto
nationalization. By their very nature, decisions of that sort are taken in great hurry and
with very little reliable information about the true state of the beneficiaries’ balance sheets.
Hence the two basic questions that we address in this section: i) which policy generates
more value per “dollar of taxpayer money”, liquidity injection or equity infusion; ii) can a
policy be designed in such a way that it provides an incentive for troubled institutions to
reveal themselves truthfully to the authorities, preventing others that are not distressed from
applying for help. In addition to answering these questions, we provide a detailed analysis
of how such policies work, including a preliminary quantitative assessment of the value the
policy creates. A major concern that we explore is the “crowding out” of private liquidity
by public liquidity.
The conceptual framework of the analysis is that of standard welfare economics, but the
model has the attractive property that social welfare, SW , is measured as expected GNP.
Since the banking industry has a measure of one, the welfare index also equals to the ex-ante
terminal value of an owner-manager of a bank. All policies involve public-sector borrowing,
ex ante at a gross interest rate of ρ0, i.e., the opportunity cost of liquidity provision is the
same for the public and the private sector. Since we assume that national debt is paid via
lump-sum taxes, the government can increase the scale of the intervention with no substantial
cost. In theory, it can tax and redistribute away the entire shock. Since this is not a realistic
assumption we introduce the above-mentioned test of policy effectiveness measured by the
value per dollar of taxpayers’ money.
A. Liquidity injection
We start by analyzing the effect of total liquidity,X, on welfare SW (from this point onwards,
the symbol F denotes private liquidity). We analyze the socially-optimal level of liquidity
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in the economy, which the government (or the central bank) would implement had it been
the sole supplier. Later on we re-introduce private speculators and discuss “the division of
labour” between private and public action. Clearly, the government will “make losses” on
its liquidity position, X, off crisis (when liquidity is held idly) and will “make a profits”
in crisis (when liquidity is used to buy capital goods cheaply); both profits and losses are
redistributed back the economy via lump-sum taxes or transfers.
A bank may turn out to be either short of capital (SC) or slack/long (LC), in normal
market conditions (N) or in financial crisis (C). In the latter case, a SC bank may be either
credit rationed (CR) or not (NR). Table 3 lists the unconditional expected masses of banks
and their payoffs conditional on the realization of θ, before any distribution of taxes or
transfers:
Table 3
Unconditional expected masses and payoffs for various realizations: banks may be
capital-short (SC) or capital slacked (LC), in normal (N) market conditions or in
crisis (C). SC companies can be either credit rationed (CR) or not (NR). Payoffs do not
include taxes or lump-sum transfer of the government’s “trading profits”.
Realization Expected mass Payoff
N, LC
R θ∗
0
(1− θ)h (θ) dθ wn + (2y − 1)
N, SC
R θ∗
0
θh (θ) dθ w + (2y − 1)− (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ)
C, LC
R θ
θ∗ (1− θ)h (θ) dθ wn
δ
q +
³
2y − δq
´
C, SC, NR
R θ
θ∗θμ (θ)h (θ) dθ w
δ
q +
³
2y − δq
´
− (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢
C, SC, CR
R θ
θ∗θ [1− μ (θ)]h (θ) dθ w
δ
q
Using the assumption that W = 1 we cancel out the redistributive effect of the shock, θ.
Hence, the SW function includes the expected level of wealth (plus interest), profits (net of
interest charges), with liquidations accounted for in market prices. From that we subtract
the government’s debt repayment, ρ0X, and add the maturity value of the government’s
portfolio, X in no-crisis states and δqX in crisis states, which is lump-sum transferred back
to the economy:
SW =
R θ∗
0
[1 + (2y − 1)− θ (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ)]h (θ) dθ (14)
+
R θ
θ∗
½
δ
q
+ [1− θ (1− μ)]
µ
2y − δ
q
¶
− θμ (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢¾
h (θ) dθ
− (ρ0 − 1)X + (1−H)
µ
δ
q
− 1
¶
X.
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Unfortunately, the SW function lacks the usual regularity properties (say, concavity) and
is thus difficult to analyze. The following proposition reflects this difficulty.
Proposition 4 i) For any probability density function h, the social-welfare function is lo-
cally increasing in X at the competitive-equilibrium point. ii) For any density function h,
there exist a ρ0 > 1 sufficiently low so that the social-welfare function is increasing monoton-
ically over
£
0, θ
¤
and the optimal liquidity-injection policy involves a zero-probability of crisis.
iii) When θ is uniformly distributed, i.e. h ≡ 1/θ, the policy-maker’s problem always has a
corner solution with a zero probability of a crisis.
The proposition shows that the amount of liquidity supplied in a competitive equilibrium
is inefficiently low. Welfare can therefore be improved by increasing total liquidity. The
intuition is straightforward: low fire-sales prices increase the amount of collateral in lending
and thereby the amount of liquidations. Liquidations are inefficient, but the speculators who
supply liquidity do not internalize this inefficiency. The price at which they buy does not
reflect the productivity loss of the assets, but rather the scarcity of available liquidity.20
Could the government implement the optimal X calculated in Proposition (4) above by
“topping up” private liquidity, F , with its own injected liquidity, I, such that F + I = X?
The following lemma shows that the answer to this question is no.
Lemma 3 (Crowding out) As long as speculators participate in the market, namely F > 0,
injected public liquidity, I, crowds out private liquidity one-for-one, with no effect on its
aggregate supply, X. Hence, if the government wants to increase the supply of liquidity
beyond the competitive level, it will have to supply the entire market, not just the increment
above the competitive level.
Proof. As long as F > 0 the aggregate supply of liquidity, X, needs to satisfy conditions
(12) and (13), otherwise there is no private incentive to participate in the market. Hence,
X is uniquely given and an increase in I crowds out F to leave X unchanged.
Hence, in order to have any effect, a liquidity-injection policy will have to “nationalize”
the liquidity market. This suggests that governments will need to take on a large debt
burden so as to raise the resources necessary to take over the entire provision of liquidity
to the economy. Subsection D develops a numerical example to illustrate the quantitative
implications of this result.
20This result is related to the pecuniary externality of banks’ decisions to invest in liquid assets that
operates via the interim spot market for illiquid assets (see Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987).
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B. Equity injection
The standard interpretation of the assumption that cash flows are non-verifiable in Hart
and Moore (1998) is that the parties to the contract can observe outcomes (hence, contract
renegotiation is modelled with bargaining under symmetric information) while third parties
— particularly the courts — cannot (which makes outcomes non contractible). It is natural to
extend the third-party assumption to the government. Hence, we turn next to the analysis
of non-discriminating equity injections — a bailout (perhaps partial) of the entire banking
industry.
Suppose that the government borrows an amount E and distributes it equally across all
the banks in the economy. Having their resources increased to w + E will have two effects
on capital-short banks. First, during normal times, they can fund a greater fraction of the
investment internally and need to pledge less as collateral:
db (δ)
dE
≡ − 1
δ (1− λπ) + λπy < 0.
During financial crisis the equilibrium amount of collateral b will still equal 1, but being
better capitalized, distressed banks bear lower prices before they hit credit rationing:
dq
dE
= − δq
(λπy)2 + 4 (1− λπ) δ (1− w)
< 0.
An important observation is that the supply of liquidity is:
F + (1− θ) (wn +E − 1) + θ (1− μ) (w +E) ,
where F still denotes the private supply of liquidity (perhaps zero). Hence, all the extra
equity that is injected into capital-slack banks will find its way into the liquidity market. By
the same logic, the demand for liquidity is:
μθ (1− w −E) + θμ (1− π)βq.
Hence, the equity that is injected into capital-short companies will directly decrease their
demand for external funding. We can thus calculate:
θ∗ =
F +E
δ (1− π) b (δ) , (15)
μ =
F +E + θ
θ
£
1 + q (1− π)
¤ ,
where
b (δ) =
1− w −E
δ (1− λπ) + λπy .
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A crucial observation is immediately apparent: equity injections have the same direct effect
on the market as liquidity injections but they also have a wealth effect. Going over the same
steps as in the previous sub-section, we can see that the social-welfare function is almost
identical to equation (20), which is a simplified version of the welfare function SW in (14).
SW =
R θ∗
0
[2y − θ (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ)]h (θ) dθ (16)
+
R θ
θ∗ [2y − θ (1− μ) 2y + θ (1− μ)− θμ (1− π) (2y − δ)]h (θ) dθ
− (ρ0 − 1) (F +E) .
Proposition 5 For the three cases identified in Proposition 4, an equity injection dominates
a liquidity injection. That includes the case where private speculators are active; namely, the
one-to-one crowding-out result is no longer valid for equity injections.
Although other papers have suggested that liquidity or equity injections can mitigate a
financial crisis (e.g., Krishnamurty, 2009, or Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2009), we are, to the best
of our knowledge, the first to provide a clear welfare comparison between the two policies.
C. Bailouts
Next, we enrich the policy analysis by examining the government’s ability to design a tar-
geted policy that bails out only distressed banks. Conventionally, a “bailout” means a
government program that buys the liquidation rights of distressed borrowers from their re-
spective creditors and writes them off. We assume that distress is not directly observable
by the government (in line with our assumptions so far), but that banks can declare to be
distressed and request a bailout. The government can then buy liquidation rights from the
distressed bank’s lender and cancel them. We assume that the transaction is done at market
prices, and that the lender cannot bargain a higher price with the government.
As described above, even a non-distressed bank would enroll in a bailout program, cancel
as much debt as possible and then settle the rest. To prevent that from happening, the
program will have to include some additional terms such that the bailout is only incentive
compatible for the distressed banks. Specifically, we assume that liquidations are observed
by the government and that the transfer of the government’s bailout money can be made
contingent on observing that some pre-specified amount of collateral is actually repossessed
by the lender, i.e., liquidated.
Let
γ ≡ units bailed out
units of collateral
,
where “units of collateral” refers to the units of capital goods that can be seized by the lender
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under the debt contract. γ is then the fraction of the collateral that the government buys
from the lender and leaves with the borrower if he participates in the bailout programme.
We assume that the government commits to a certain γ (after the realization of θ), which
neither the debtor nor the creditor can re-negotiate. Notice that we do make the strong
assumption here that “liquidation” is an observable action. Moreover, that this liquidation
is irreversible so that the borrower and the lender cannot collude to fake a liquidation or
undo it once it has been taken. To some extent, the strength of this assumption justifies the
analysis of the previous sub-section.
In case of repossession the payoffs to the debtor and to the creditor are (1− βc) y+γβcy
and βcq, respectively, where βc is the contracted collateral, the basis on which the bailout
is calculated; notice that βc can exceed one. It is thus more economically meaningful to
express the problem in terms of the effective collateral, β = (1− γ)βc. Written that way,
the feasibility constraint remains β ≤ 1, as before. Defining
σ =
γ
1− γ ,
we can then write
βcq = (1 + σ)βq
and interpret σ as a subsidy paid to creditors on top of the liquidation value βq.
Consider debt renegotiation when the borrower does not suffer from a liquidity shock,
i.e., his date 2 cash flow is y. Like before, the borrower and lender are each granted the op-
portunity to make a take-it or leave-it offer RD and RC to the other party, with probabilities
(1− λ) and λ, respectively. If the borrower wants his offer to be accepted by the lender he
will have to set it at no less than RD = (1 + σ)βq, leaving him with y − RD. Clearly, the
higher the subsidy, the higher the payment that the lender can extract from the debtor. If
the borrower makes an offer that is not accepted by the lender, the former loses a fraction
1−γ of contracted collateral. He thus receives (1− β) y. The government therefore needs to
keep the subsidy down to levels that still leave a non-distressed borrower with an incentive
to repay rather than opt for default. Comparing the two payoffs, it is easy to see that an
incentive-compatible bailout policy has to satisfy the following constraint:
σ ≤ y − q
q
. (17)
The same constraint applies to the case where the lender gives the borrower an offer RC.
Intuitively, the constraint implies that the government should keep the after-subsidy fire-sale
price below the fundamental value.
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We can now complete the specification of the contract problem in an environment where
the government has already announced a policy that satisfies the constraint (17). The opti-
mal contract (R, β) can be calculated, like before, from the borrower’s incentive compatibility
constraint on the amount of debt repayment R and lender’s participation constraint. These
are given by
R ≤ β [(1− λ) (1 + σ) q + λy] ,
πR+ (1− π) (1 + σ)βq = ρ1 (1− w) , (18)
respectively, and the solution to the contract problem is
b =
ρ1 (1− w)
q (1 + σ) (1− λπ) + λπy . (19)
Clearly, at a given fire-sale price, collateral requirements are decreasing in the subsidy. Notice
that once the subsidy hits the policy constraint (17), the denominator in equation (19)
reduces to y.
Consider, first, an equilibrium with a slack of liquidity (ρ1 = 1). In that case the
subsidy can go all the way up to the limit defined by the policy constraint (17) which yields
b = (1− w) /y < 1. Next, consider the case of a crisis equilibrium. Could the subsidy be
increased to the point where it hits the (17) constraint? Using (19) we can calculate the
equilibrium fire-sale price that would result, i.e., q that sets b = 1. This allows us to calculate
ρ1 = y/ (1− w), which under the parametric assumptions defined in Table 1 would violate
assumption (A2). Namely, low fire-sale prices would push the rate of return ρ1 to a level that
would strip banks of any incentive to operate their projects; the government would have to
set the subsidy at a lower rate. Regardless of whether liquidity is slack or in short supply,
the fiscal cost of an individual bailout is σ (1− π)βq and the cost of the entire program is
θ (1− π)σβq.
Proposition 6 Consider an economy with a “small” equity injection program, E, where
E is constant across all θ’s, implemented alongside a competitive liquidity market where
speculators supply an amount F ∗ > 0, the probability of a crisis is (1−H∗) and equilibrium
fire-sale prices are q ∈ {δ, q∗}. A bailout program can achieve the same level of collateral
requirement (and thus liquidation) at less than a θρ1 fraction of the national debt, albeit with
a possible increase in the cost of aggregate (public plus private) liquidity.
The above proposition shows that a policy that targets distressed banks alone can achieve
the same welfare improvement as an equity injection while incurring less national debt.
Hence, its value added per dollar of taxpayer money is higher. The effectiveness of such a
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policy is, however, limited by the two policy constraints described above (incentive compat-
ibility for a non-distressed borrower to repay, and incentive for banks to invest in a project).
This raises the important question what the quantitative importance of this limitation is.
We will discuss quantitative relevance in the next section.
D. Discussion and numerical example
The market for liquidity is inherently inefficient. Normally, markets “create value” by allo-
cating commodities from low-value users to high-value users. The opposite happens when
investment goods are sold on the fire-sale market. Here, commodities are allocated from high-
value users to low-value users, driven not by a “fundamental” trading motive but rather by
verifiability constraints. The stark difference between equation (13), which determines F in
a competitive equilibrium, and condition (21) which the government uses in order to cal-
culate socially-desired X provides a technical substance to this observation. Evidently, the
difference between the fundamental value of repossessed investment goods and their fire-sale
price (namely, the loss of value due to liquidation) does not appear in the former expression
but does appear in the latter. Hence, by ex-post price-manipulation the government can
diminish potential destruction of value and decrease the probability of crisis.
Although policy in our model has a first-order effect on welfare, our numerical example
traces only modest quantitative effects: a policy of liquidity-injection that brings the proba-
bility of crisis down to zero would increase welfare by only 0.3% relative to the competitive
equilibrium; see Table 4. This, surprisingly small number might seem like an artefact of the
model. We believe that this is not the case: the ex ante loss of welfare due to financial crises
is, roughly, the loss of output in a crisis, times the probability of crisis. Using the actual
Reinhart-Rogoff data (a probability of 7.2% times a GDP decline of 8.8%, see Table 2) will
leave us with a similar order of magnitude. Hence, the more general conclusion that seems
to arise is that welfare effects might be an order of magnitude below the output effect. This
conclusion does not require that we interpret our numbers as a calibration of the model: any
parameterization that would fit the Reinhart-Rogoff data is likely to reach similar results.
Ultimately, our conclusions are driven by the observation that the government’s ability
to inject liquidity, conditional on a crisis requires it to have the option of accessing the
corresponding funds unconditionally. This option is costly. In our model the cost is simply
the difference in the rate of return between investment in a liquid or an illiquid asset. Other
authors (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) allow governments to “produce” liquidity ex post,
i.e., after a crisis has occurred. Such superior access of governments to liquidity, compared to
the technology of private agents is argued to stem from the government’s ability to issue debt
against its future tax base. We do not adopt this modelling approach for the following reason.
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While governments have a unique ability to tax, they also have the unique weakness of not
being able to commit contractually to repay their debt. This limits their debt capacity.21 In
order to be able to produce liquidity ex post, governments thus need to leave some unused
debt capacity ex ante (and thus invest less in illiquid technologies like the education system
or infrastructure). Our assumption that the government’s liquidity needs to be set aside ex
ante (just like private speculators’) thus can be viewed as capturing the cost of unutilized
debt capacity in term of the lost output from an illiquid technology.
Table 4
A comparison of welfare and national debt (ND) under competitive equilibrium (CE),
liquidity injection (LI), equity injection (EI) and bailouts (BO). EI is implemented at two
levels: either bringing the probability of crisis down to zero (ZC), or at ND = 1%.
BO is implemented at a level that would achieve the same β as the second EI
policy (for any realization of θ), leaving the government with a slack of liquidity,
generically. ND is expressed as a percentage of full-capacity (i.e. no rationing)
capital stock, namely one unit. For structural parameters see Table 1.
Description Model Value
Liquidity injection
welfare gain at ZC SWLI−ZCÁSWCE − 1 0.3%
ND under LI-ZC θδ (1− π) β 2.6%
Equity Injection
welfare gain at ZC SWEI−ZCÁSWCE − 1 0.4%
ND under EI-ZC θδ (1− π)βEI 2.4%
welfare gain at 1% injection SWEI−1%ÁSWCE − 1 0.06%
ND 1%
prob. of crisis 1−H
³
θEI−1%
´
7.4%
Bailouts equivalent to 1% EI
ND θδ (1− π)βBO 0.3%
government’s liquidity slack 0 to 0.3%
In line with the theoretical results, Table 4 also shows the dominance of equity injections
21See Guembel and Sussman (2009) for a model of a government’s debt capacity when a sovereign default
is costless.
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over liquidity injections: to bring the probability of crisis down to zero it takes an equity
injection of only 2.4%, with a welfare gain of 0.4% (compared with 2.6% and 0.3% under
liquidity injection, respectively). This is surprising since indiscriminate transfers to distressed
and non-distressed banks alike seems like a “waste of money”. This logic does not apply
since all the “wasteful” equity injections trickle down to the equity market and thus support
fire-sale prices. To put it differently, equity injections have both a balance-sheet and a price
effect while liquidity injections will have only the latter effect.
Table 4 also shows that a discriminating bail-out policy will give taxpayers more value
for their money: an equity injection of 1% would decrease the probability of financial crisis
down from 7.7% in the competitive case (see Table 2) to 7.4%. A bailout policy would
achieve the same level collateral requirement and liquidation (under the worst case of θ)
with national debt of only 0.3%, still leaving the government with some slack of liquidity in
all other realizations of θ.
VI. Globalization, capital-flows and international contagion
It has been argued that the globalized financial system that was created by the gradual
deregulation of capital flows during the last twenty years or so has facilitated cross-country
contagion and has contributed to financial instability. For example, Calvo (1998) claims
that the 1998 Asian-Russian crisis was caused by a “sudden stop” where capital inflows were
reversed and market liquidity escaped abroad. In this section we examine this claim by
splitting the model economy above — now used as a benchmark — into two separate countries
and then analyze its performance with and without restrictions on the free capital flows.
Suppose that banks in each country are exposed to a redistributive shock, but the sum
of the two country-shocks has the same density function as the redistributive shock in the
benchmark economy. Since all other parameters are the same, the two-country model reduces
to the benchmark model once the regulation on capital flows across countries is removed.
We make a distinction between two types of liquidity: domestic and international.22 The
former is prevented by regulation from leaving the country (once in), the latter is unregulated
and is allowed to flow freely across countries. As we shall see, there is no private incentive
to hold domestic liquidity. It should thus be interpreted either as liquidity injection by
the domestic authorities (perhaps in the form of central bank reserves) or as a capital /
liquidity requirement imposed on market makers and investment banks in exchange of a
22A similar distinction is made in Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2009) who, like us, point out that
international contagion may result when countries access a common pool of liquidity. In their paper, however,
restrictions on capital flows are technological. In ours they are a choice variable, which allows us to conduct
a corresponding policy and welfare analysis.
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license to maintain another activity, domestically. In line with the assumptions made so far,
we do not allow the regulation to be contingent on the realization of the shock, giving it an
interpretation of a long-term structural parameter of the economy rather than a short-term
policy instrument.
More specifically, assume two countries, A and B. Let the measure of banks in each
be one half. Denote the mass of capital-short banks by θA and θB with a joint density
h (θA, θB) = 1θ(θA+θB) on [0, θ] × [0, θ] with θA + θB ≤ θ <
1
2
. It follows that θ ≡ θA + θB
is uniformly distributed on
£
0, θ
¤
. The shock is redistributive: country A, say, has 1
2
− θA
capital-slacked banks, wn is a function of θA so that the aggregate country endowment is
fixed deterministically at W
2
. At t = 0 speculators may set aside “international” liquidity, F ,
that can flow from one country to another upon the realization of the country shocks. At the
same time, t = 0, speculators can also allocate resources towards country-specific “domestic”
liquidity LA and LB, that is restricted by regulation from flowing to the other country upon
the realization of uncertainty. As in the benchmark model, liquidity is used either to fund
capital-short banks or participate in the fire-sale market. All other assumptions remain the
same implying that the special case LA = LB = 0 reduces the benchmark model with a
uniform distribution of θ.
Using (10), we can define the following variables:
bθA = min½θ, LAδ (1− π) b (δ)
¾
,
θ∗A = min
½
θ,
F + LA
δ (1− π) b (δ)
¾
,
θmax = min
½
θ,
F + LA + LB
δ (1− π) b (δ)
¾
.
We think of bθA as the largest country-A shock such that the country avoids crisis while using
its domestic liquidity, LA, alone. (Like before, crisis means a shortage of liquidity, low fire-
sale prices and credit rationing.) Similarly, θ∗A denotes the largest shock such that country
A avoids crisis while using both its domestic liquidity, LA, and the international liquidity,
F . For country B , bθB and θ∗B are defined in the same manner.
It is clear that international liquidity will flow to the country with the higher return.
Hence, if one country is in crisis and the other is not, all international liquidity will flow to
the former. This allows us to characterize, in Figure 4, combinations of θA and θB in which
crises occurs.23
23Like before, we focus only the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
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Figure 4
The equilibrium level of liquidation prices qA and qB in countries
A and B, depending on the realizations of θA and θB.
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Consider country A. If θA ≤ bθA, then the country’s own liquidity LA is sufficient to avoid
crisis, no matter how much liquidity is required in country B. When bθA < θA ≤ θ∗A then
country A needs to draw on the international liquidity in order to avoid crisis. To what
extent it can do so depends on the shock realized in country B. If θB is sufficiently low
(namely θB ≤ θmax − θA) both countries would avoid crisis. However, as θB increases, it
draws in more international liquidity, up to the point where the international liquidity is not
sufficient to avoid a simultaneous or a systemic crisis in both countries. This happens when
θB > θmax − θA. At this point, if one country is in crisis (say θB just tips across the point
θA + θB = θmax) then the other country is also in crisis. This follows immediately from the
downwards sloping demand curves for liquidity.
Hence, crisis is contagious across countries: holding θA constant at some level smaller
than θ∗A and increasing the level of the shock in country B, there is a point at which the
shock spills over and creates crisis in country A. It is thus clear that domestic liquidity is
useful: it shields one country from the other’s shock. But there is a downside as well: if
θA > θ∗A, country A is in crisis while it uses all domestic as well as international liquidity,
while country B is not in crisis and has a slack of domestic liquidity. Moreover, below the
dotted line, both countries could avoid crisis if only the domestic liquidity of country B
could be deployed to country A. Evidently, compartmentalizing the world economy into
liquidity-enclosed countries is potentially ex-post inefficient in its use of liquidity.
Next, we calculate the probability of crisis. Denote by ρF and ρA the realized rate of
return on international liquidity, F , and domestic liquidity LA, respectively. Obviously,
ρF = 1 if there is a slack of liquidity in both countries and ρF =
δ
q otherwise. Similarly,
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ρA = 1 if there is a slack of liquidity in country A and ρA =
δ
q otherwise. We can calculate
the probabilities of high / low returns on domestic or international liquidity by integrating
the density function h (θA, θB) over the appropriate intervals depicted in Figure 4. This
yields:
Pr (ρF = 1) =
θ∗B
θ
(ln θmax − ln (θ∗B)) +
θ∗A
θ
(ln θmax − ln θ∗A) +
θ∗A − bθA
θ
,
Pr (ρA = 1) =
1
θ
³
θ∗A (1 + ln θmax − ln θ∗A) + bθA ¡ln θ − ln θmax¢´ .
But would profit-oriented speculators ever wish to invest in LA or LB, instead of F? The
following lemma provides a negative answer.
Lemma 4 In a competitive equilibrium the amount of domestic liquidity (LA, LB) is zero
while international liquidity is
F = θδ (1− π) b (δ)
δ
q − ρ0
δ
q − 1
.
A crisis occurs with probability ρ0−1δ
q−1
.
It follows that strictly positive amounts of domestic liquidity can be obtained only through
public policy: either directly through domestic liquidity injection (by the government or the
central bank) or indirectly by requiring that foreign speculators in some lines of domestic
business have to hold domestic liquidity. Since the rate of return on domestic liquidity is
low relative to international liquidity, the regulation will have to compensate them in some
other way, perhaps by allowing them to collect rents on these other lines of business (which
might explain why restrictions on international capital flows often go hand in hand with
oligopolistic financial markets).
The next question is whether such policy adds value. Consider the following events: (i)
there is a crisis in country A alone, (ii) there is a crisis in country B alone, (iii) there is
a systemic crisis in both countries. Denote the probabilities of these events by pA, pB, and
pAfB, respectively. Only if one of the three events occurs will ρF > 1; hence Pr (ρF > 1) =
pA + pB + pAfB. The following proposition computes the equilibrium probabilities of these
events, taking into consideration the crowding-out effect on international liquidity.
Proposition 7 Suppose LA and LB are sufficiently small such that the competitive liquidity
supply F > 0 and θmax < θ. In that case an increase in LA reduces the probability pAfB of a
systemic crisis, but it does not affect the probability pAfB+pA+pB that at least one country
experiences a crisis.
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There are two points worth noting. First, domestic liquidity injection leads to crowding
out of private liquidity so that the overall probability of a crisis remains unaffected. Second,
although market compartmentalization does not affect the overall probability of a crisis,
it dampens contagion: there are now realizations of θA, for which crisis does not occur in
country A when one would have occurred there in absence of domestic liquidity LA. Take
values θA < bθA, where domestic liquidity avoids a crisis in country A for any value of θB. If
markets were fully integrated (LA = LB = 0), a crisis in A would have occurred whenever
θB > Fδ(1−π)b(δ) − θA. It follows that a crisis could be contained domestically when it would
have spilled over to the other country in a market without domestic liquidity.
A. Discussion and numerical example
It follows from the above discussion that domestic liquidity has an ambiguous effect on the
economy: it avoids contagion but at a cost of idle liquidity. Hence, the correct way to evaluate
the policy is by calculating ex-ante social welfare, SW , which is measured (like before) in
terms of expected GDP in both countries, equivalent to expected terminal value per owner-
manager of a bank. The calculation is similar to that in Section V, taking expectations
over banks’ short / slacked capital, when none of the countries, one or both of them going
through financial crisis. See Appendix 3 for more detail. Unfortunately, at this point the
model becomes too complicated to handle analytically, so we carry on with our numerical
example. We consider symmetric regulation, namely L = LA = LB.
Figure 4 plots SW as a function of domestic liquidity for two cases: with and without
restrictions on capital-flows — dashed and bold lines, respectively. In the former case domestic
liquidity is just L as defined above. The latter case reduces to benchmark model with the
combined domestic liquidity in both countries playing the same role as injected liquidity in
Section A above, generating numerically identical results to those derived there. The flat
segment is due to the one-to-one crowding-out effect discussed in Lemma 3. The steeply
increasing segment is where private liquidity is fully crowded out and the policy of liquidity
injections starts being effective. Once there is enough liquidity to prevent crisis completely,
liquidity stands idle for any realization of θ and SW is falling in liquidity (now only incurring
the opportunity cost).
In the case where capital flows are restricted, private liquidity, F , is also allowed to re-
spond endogenously to the changes in domestic liquidity. However, the policy is not neutral
as implied by Proposition 7. Initially, more domestic liquidity decreases the probability of
systemic crisis and increases SW . At some point, however, systemic crisis vanishes and the
effect of idle liquidity dominates, so the curve starts sloping downwards. Then, the SW
function reaches a minimum at the point where private liquidity, F , vanishes completely.
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From there on SW is increasing again in L because it reduces the probability of domestic
crisis. Crucially, the curve is way below the free-capital-mobility curve because of idle liq-
uidity. The reason is obvious: in each country, the shock may be as high as θ, the same as
the combined shock for both countries. Hence, to avoid a country crisis with certainty, each
country has to hold enough liquidity to meet a θ shock, the same as an integrated market
needs to hold. Hence, by integrating their liquidity markets, the two countries can decrease
by half the amount of liquidity they need to hold in order to avoid a crisis. To conclude,
restrictions on capital flows can add value when liquidity is scarce and the governments can
afford to inject only small amounts, but the non-monotonic nature of the SW function would
make it hard to fine-tune a policy of that nature.
Figure 5
Social welfare as a function of domestic country liquidity,
with and without restrictions on capital mobility.
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VII. Conclusions
This paper provides an analytical framework for the study of liquidity crises. It is couched
firmly in a neoclassical framework with contracting frictions. The destabilizing effect of the
market for liquidity derives from one simple peculiarity: demand and supply are sloping in
the same direction. This observation allows us to capture the phenomenon of a crisis, which
may occur both as a multiplicity of equilibria or as the unique equilibrium, depending on
the magnitude of an aggregate shock.
Although many of the ingredients of our model have been used elsewhere, our framework
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unifies them and allows a simple and realistic characterization of crises. This allows us to
generate a simple and observable measure of welfare and thus lends credibility to our policy
analysis. In it, we find that the welfare gains from liquidity injections or bailouts by the
government improve welfare, but only by a small amount. This is surprising, given the
dramatic price effects of a crisis.
An interesting avenue for further research would be to link the current analysis more
closely to macroeconomic questions of monetary and fiscal policy. Some of that literature
uses concepts that are closely related to our, more micro founded analysis, for example cash-
in-advance constraints or a liquidity trap. A full integration of the macro and microeconomic
research in this fields remains an open topic for research.
Appendix 1: Data construction for Figure 1
Let ei,t and li,t be the equity (either book or market) and total book liabilities of banking
holding-company i at end-of-quarter t. For the period Q1−2005 to Q4−2009, all COMPU-
STAT commercial banks (SIC codes 6021-6022) are surveyed, of which only the listed ones
are kept, and matched with CRSP market equity. The number of banks in the data set varies
from 257 to 350. Each period, the data are sorted by an increasing order of capitalization,
so that the most highly levered bank is indexed one.
For each period, the Lorenz Curve is defined as
¡
lj,t, ej,t
¢
where
lj,t =
jX
i=1
li,tP50
i=1 li,t
,
ej,t =
jX
i=1
ei,tP50
i=1 ei,t
.
By construction, the Lorenz Curve is increasing, concave, and straddles from (0, 0) to (1, 1).
The Gini coefficient is the ratio between two areas: i) the one between the Lorenz Curve
and the diagonal of the (0, 0)-(1, 1) box, and ii) the triangle bellow that diagonal. Since the
Lorenz Curve is always below the above diagonal, the Gini coefficient is between zero and
one. If all banks are equally-well capitalized, the Gini would be zero; otherwise, the bigger
are the differences in cross-banks capitalization, the higher is the Gini. Market (book) Gini
is defined for market (book) equity, ei,t.
The spread series measures the yield differential between LIBOR and government bonds,
both of 6-months maturity denominated in US dollars.
Appendix 2: Sensitivity analysis
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To check the robustness of our numerical example, we calculate below the elasticity of the
key endogenous variables with respect to the main structural parameters. As key endogenous
variables we consider the three variables in Table 2, for which there is actual data, namely
those that are used in order to check the model’s quantitative fit. These variables are: price-
drop in crisis, output-drop in crisis and the probability of a crisis. We describe the results
of the exercise in Table A1 below. To remove doubt, the result should be red as follows: a
−2.92 elasticity of the probability of crisis with respect to the wealth endowment of capital-
short companies means that when the latter increases from 0.6 to 0.606, the former falls
from 7.7% to 7.5%. Obviously, the calculations are valid for a single point in the parameter
space, namely that which is characterized by Table 1. Since all the main results are based on
the model’s non-linearity, it is important to check that this point in the parameter space is
not knife-edged, namely that the sensitivity of the results to the parameters is not explosive.
Indeed, the analysis seems to confirm that the model is (locally) stable in that respect: the
highest elasticity is just below 3 and many below 1.
Table A1
Sensitivity analysis: the elasticity of key endogenous variables
with respect to some of the structural parameters: price drop in
crisis, output drop in crisis and the probability of crisis.
q
δ − 1 Y |q=qÁ Y |q=δ − 1 1−H (θ∗)
parameters
δ 0.34 0.26 −0.57
y 0.85 0.97 −1.39
π 0.65 −2, 65 −1.06
w 1.81 1.73 −2.92
Appendix 3: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. : It follows from the discussion of (4) that the solution of the
contracting problem is the minimal β within the problem’s feasible set. The graph of (PC)
is a downwards-sloping line in the (R, β) space; (IC) is represented by the area above an
upwards-sloping line in the same space. Hence, the minimal point that satisfies both (IC)
and (PC) is the intersection point between the two graphs (when the former holds with
equality). That point is defined by equation (5). If b ≤ 1, then (5) also defines the optimal
contract; if b > 1 the feasible set is empty and the bank cannot obtain any funding.
Proof of Lemma 2. : It follows from equation (8) that S is increasing in q and that
the rent for capital-slacked companies is greater than the rent for capital-short companies.
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Hence, a sufficient condition for a positive rent at any feasible equilibrium price is that the
rent for capital short companies at q = q is positive. Substituting w = w and b
¡
q
¢
= 1 into
equation (8) we derive the condition above.
Proof of Proposition 1. : When there is a slack of liquidity in the market speculators
bid-up the fire-sale price to δ and still there is enough funding for all banks, so μ = 1. Clearly
F +W − 1− θ [1 + δ (1− π) b (δ)] = 0.
When this condition fails, and since qb (q) is decreasing in q — see equation (5) — the market-
clearing condition cannot hold with μ = 1 for any other price in
£
q, δ
¤
. Hence the critical
point, F+W−1δ(1−π)b(δ) , so that for any θ above, credit rationing is the unique equilibrium.
In a credit-rationing equilibrium the fire-sale price drops to q and
F +W − 1− θ
£
1 + q (1− π)
¤
5 0;
remember that, by construction, b
¡
q
¢
= 1. Consider the point where that condition holds
with equality so that credit-rationing just appears. Since qb (q) is decreasing in q, there must
also be a liquidity-slack equilibrium. Hence the critical point F+W−1q(1−π) so that for any θ below,
the liquidity slack is the unique equilibrium.
Due to assumption (A1) the second critical point is greater than the first. It follows that
in between there are multiple equilibria with either credit rationing, liquidity slack or a fire
sale price in
¡
q, δ
¢
where the market-clearing condition (10) holds with equality for μ = 1.
Substituting q = q into the market-clearing condition (10) we can solve for the amount
of credit rationing, or the unconditional probability of being credit rationed.
Proof of Proposition 2. : Let qebe the expected fire-sale price. Then, equilibrium is
determined by substituting
bGR =
δ
qe (1− w)
qe (1− λπ) + λπy
into the equilibrium condition (10). Clearly, the demand for liquidity is no longer sensitive
to the actual market price, q. Hence, if for a certain realization of θ, δ was one of a few
equilibrium prices, it is the unique equilibrium if qe = δ. Since there was enough liquidity
to fund capital-short banks and absorb fire sales at a price of δ when expectations were not
fixed, δ will be the actual fire-sale price when qe = δ. In such a case, if the government
guarantees a price of δ, the holders of the guarantees will not exercise their option and the
fiscal cost of the policy to the government is zero. Hence, the policy is credible and, indeed,
qe = δ. Notice that this argument does not hold for θs where q is the unique equilibrium
price (without price guarantees).
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Proof of Proposition 3. : First, notice that the expected return on investing in liquidity
is given by E (ρ1) = H (θ
∗) + [1−H (θ∗)] δq , which is strictly decreasing in F and is equal
to δq for F = 0. If F is small (large) so that E (ρ1) > ρ0 (E (ρ1) < ρ0) this cannot be
an equilibrium since more (less) speculators would invest in the liquid asset. Hence, θ∗ is
uniquely given by the solution to (13) and F is determined by equation (12). Notice that
the probability of a financial crisis is (ρ0 − 1) /
³
δ
q − 1
´
, independently of h.
Proof of Proposition 4. : Since the government’s trading profits (during crisis) are
redistributive, they can be cancelled out using
θμ (θ) q (1− π) = X + [1− μ (θ)] θ,
which is derived from (11), so as to simplify the social-welfare function
SW =
R θ∗
0
[2y − θ (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ)]h (θ) dθ (20)
+
R θ
θ∗ [2y − θ (1− μ) (2y − 1)− θμ (1− π) (2y − δ)]h (θ) dθ
− (ρ0 − 1)X.
Taking a derivative with respect to X and denoting μ∗ ≡ μ (θ∗) we get
d
dX
SW = [2y − θ∗ (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ)]h (θ∗) dθ
∗
dF
− [2y − θ∗ (1− μ∗) (2y − 1)− θ∗μ∗ (1− π) (2y − δ)]h (θ∗) dθ
∗
dX
+ [(2y − 1)− (1− π) (2y − δ)] [1−H (θ∗)] ∂
∂X
θ∗μ∗
− (ρ0 − 1) ,
which can be simplified to
d
dF
SW = [Abθ∗ −Aθ∗μ∗]h (θ∗)
dθ∗
dX
(21)
+A [1−H (θ∗)] ∂ (θ
∗μ∗)
∂X
− (ρ0 − 1) ,
where
A = (2y − 1)− (1− π) (2y − δ) ,
Ab = (2y − 1)− b (δ) (1− π) (2y − δ) ,
dθ∗
dX
=
1
δ (1− π) b (δ) ,
∂ (θ∗μ∗)
∂X
=
1
1 + q (1− π) .
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i) Since Ab > Aμ∗ and dθ
∗
dX > 0 we focus on the second and third lines of equation (21).
We rewrite condition (13) as:
[1−H (θ∗)]
µ
δ
q
− 1
¶
= (ρ0 − 1)
and using Lemma 2 we derive
A
1−H (θ∗)
1 + q (1− π) − (ρ0 − 1)
=
1−H (θ∗)
1 + q (1− π)
∙µ
2y − δ
q
¶
− (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢¸
> 0.
ii) We show, first, that A > 0 as the left-hand side of the three inequalities below add up
to A µ
2y − δ
q
¶
− (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢
> 0,
− (1− π)
¡
q − δ
¢
> 0,
δ
q
− 1 > 0.
Since Ab > A the first line of equation (21) is positive for any μ ∈ [0, 1]; the whole expression
is thus positive for a sufficiently low ρ0.
iii)We show, first, that the social-welfare function is convex when θ is uniformly-distributed:
d2
dX
SW =
1
θ
dθ∗
dX
∙
Ab
dθ∗
dX
− 2Ad (θ
∗μ∗)
dX
¸
=
1
θ
µ
dθ∗
dX
¶2 d (θ∗μ∗)
dX
©
[Ab −Aδ (1− π) b (δ)] + (1− π)
£
Abq −Aδb (δ)
¤ª
> 0
where q > δb (δ) is implied by the downward sloping demand for liquidity. Since we have
already shown that social welfare is increasing at the competitive X (where θ∗ < θ) that
implies a corner solution (at the point where θ∗ = θ).
Proof of Proposition 5. : Differentiating (16) with respect to E we get:
d
dE
SW = [2y − θ∗ (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ)]h (θ∗) dθ
∗
dE
−db (δ)
dE
(1− π) (2y − δ)
R θ∗
0
θh (θ) dθ
− [2y − θ∗ (1− μ∗) (2y − 1)− θ∗μ∗ (1− π) (2y − δ)]h (θ∗) dθ
∗
dE
+ [(2y − 1)− (1− π) (2y − δ)] [1−H (θ∗)]
∙
d
dE
F (E) +E
1 + q (1− π)
¸
− (ρ0 − 1) ,
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The notation F (E) is used in order to account for the case where where the private specu-
lators are still active. In this case
dθ∗
dE
= −
[1−H (θ∗)] δq2
dq
dE
h (θ∗)
³
δ
q − 1
´ > 0,
d
dE
F (E) +E
1 + q (1− π) =
δ (1− π) b (δ) dθ∗dE − (F +E)
dq
dE£
1 + q (1− π)
¤2 .
When the private speculators are no longer active,
dθ∗
dE
=
1
δ (1− π) b (δ)
∙
1− E
b (δ)
· db (δ)
dE
¸
,
d
dE
E
1 + q (1− π) =
1
1 + q (1− π)
∙
1− (1− π)
1 + q (1− π)
dq
dE
¸
.
Both ways, for the three cases identified in Proposition 4, by comparing the derivative above
to equation (21) one can establish that the effect of equity injection is greater than the effect
of liquidity injection. Clearly, the full crowding-out result for the former case is no longer
valid.
Proof of Proposition 6. An equity-injection equilibrium satisfies a market-clearing
condition and collateral requirement
W + F ∗ +E − (1− θ) ≥ μθ
£
1 + (1− π)βIq
¤
,
βI =
(1− w −E) ρ1
q (1− λπ) + λπy ,
respectively. Now consider a subsidy (contingent on the realized θ) of σ = Eρ1
(1−π)βIq ; using
(19) one can calculate
β
σ
=
¡
1− w − 1−λπ
1−π E
¢
ρ1
q (1− λπ) + λπy < β
I
(because 1−λπ
1−π > 1). Since β, as defined in equation (19) is decreasing in σ, β
σ
is the upper
bound on the subsidy that is required in order to implement the βI achieved by the equity-
injection for any realization of θ. The cost of this program, in the worst possible case where
θ = θ, is bounded by Eρ1θ. If the government wishes to implement the duplicating subsidy
policy in any state of nature then Eρ1θ is the liquid reserve — and the national debt — that
it needs to create. In all states of nature other than the worse case, the government would
have excess liquidity that it can use in order to generate additional welfare.
Notice that under the subsidy, the term E would vanish from the market-clearing condi-
tion, but would be substituted by private liquidity according to the crowding-out argument.
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The aggregate cost of liquidity to the economy,
£
F + θ (1− π)σβq
¤
(ρ0 − 1), would thus
increase although the cost of the public component would decrease.
The original equity-injection program should be small in the sense that the effect of E can
be duplicated by the subsidy without violating the (17), namely E ≤ (y − δ) (1− π) βI
¯¯
q=δ.
Also, the equity-injection problem should be small in the sense that q (ρ) will stay sufficiently
high (low) so that θρ1 ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. It is obvious from Figure 4 that Pr (ρA = 1) > Pr (ρF = 1) . It
follows that the expected return on domestic liquidity is strictly lower than on international
liquidity.
F is determined by the condition
Pr (ρF = 1) +
δ
q
(1− Pr (ρF = 1)) = ρ0. (22)
Using the fact that LA = LB = 0 and substituting into Pr (ρF = 1) yields the result. More-
over, Pr (ρF > 1) =
ρ0−1
δ
q−1
follows directly from the equilibrium condition (22).
Proof of Proposition 7. We know that if LA and LB are sufficiently low, the equilibrium
condition (22) has an interior solution with F > 0. It follows that in this case F is such that
pA+ pB + pAfB =
ρ0−1
δ
q−1
, i.e., a change in LA does not affect the overall probability of a crisis
somewhere.
We can calculate
pAfB =
Z θ∗A
eθA
Z θ−θA
θmax−θA
1
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA
+
Z θ∗A+θ−θmax
θ∗A
Z θ−θA
θmax−θ∗A
1
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA
This can be rewritten as
pAfB =
1
θ
³
θ∗A − bθA´ ¡ln θ − ln θmax¢
+
1
θ
¡
θ − θmax
¡
1 + ln θ − ln θmax
¢¢
.
Note that when LA and LB are so large that θmax = θ, then pAfB = 0. When θmax < θ it is
clear that the first term is decreasing in LA. Taking the derivative of the second term with
respect to LA yields − ln θ−ln θmaxθδ(1−π)b(δ) < 0, so pAfB is decreasing in LA.
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A. Social Welfare (section VI)
Social welfare can be calculated as follows. First we take expected payoffs for the parameter
region where neither region experiences a crisis. For region A this is given byZ eθA
0
Z θ−θA
0
y − θABNC
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA +
Z θ∗A
eθA
Z θmax−θA
0
y − θABNC
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA,
and similarly for region B, where
BNC = (1− π) b (δ) (2y − δ) .
We can then calculate the expected payoffs when θA and θB are such that only region A,
but not B is in a crisis.Z θ−(θmax−θ∗A)
θ∗A
Z θmax−θ∗A
0
AC,A − θABC
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA +
Z θ
θ−(θmax−θ∗A)
Z θ−θA
0
AC,A − θABC
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA,
and similarly for region B, where for j ∈ {A,B}
AC,j = y +
F + Lj
1 + q (1− π)
µ
2y − δ
q
− (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢¶
,
BC = 2y −
δ
q
−
2y − δq − (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢
1 + q (1− π) .
Finally, we can calculate the expected payoffs when both regions experience a crisis. Here
we calculate the sum of the payoffs across both regions directly:Z θ∗A
eθA
Z θ−θA
θmax−θA
ACC − (θA + θB)BC
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA+
Z θ−(θmax−θ∗A)
θ∗A
Z θ−θA
θmax−θ∗A
ACC − (θA + θB)BC
θ (θA + θB)
dθBdθA,
where
ACC = 2y +
F + LA + LB
1 + q (1− π)
µ
2y − δ
q
− (1− π)
¡
2y − q
¢¶
.
From these payoffs, we need to subtract the opportunity cost of local, and mobile liquidity.
Solving the integrals and adding up over all possible regimes, we obtain total welfare as
a function of F , where F is given by the solution to (22) (or zero, if (22) cannot be satisfied
at a positive F ).
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